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Abstract. Trust is a construct of paramount importance in society. Ac-
cordingly, computational trust is evolving fast in order to allow trust in
artiﬁcial societies. Despite the advances in this research ﬁeld, most com-
putational trust approaches evaluate trust by estimating the trustwor-
thiness of the agents under evaluation (the trustees), without however
distinguishing between the diﬀerent dimensions of trustworthiness, such
as ability and benevolence. In this paper, we propose diﬀerent techniques
to extract the ability of the trustee in the task at hand and to infer the
benevolence of the trustee toward the truster when the trust judgment
is made. Moreover, we propose to dynamically change the relative im-
portance and impact of both ability and benevolence on the perceived
trustworthiness of the trustee, taking into consideration the development
of the relationship between the truster and the trustee and the disposition
of the truster in the speciﬁc situation. Finally, we set an experimental
scenario to evaluate our approach. The results obtained from these ex-
periments show that the proposed techniques signiﬁcantly improve the
reliability of the estimation of the trustworthiness of agents.
Keywords: computational trust, benevolence, trustworthiness.
1 Introduction
Computational trust is considered an enabler technology in virtual societies, and
the estimation of trustworthiness is paramount to assess the trust that a truster
agent has on a given trustee. An individual is more or less trustworthy in per-
forming a task in a given situation depending on his ability in the matter, his
overall integrity, and the stage of his relationships with the truster. Therefore,
in order to better estimate the trustworthiness of agents, it is important to con-
sider these three dimensions individually, and to combine them in a dynamic way
taking into consideration the situation and the development of the relationship.
However, the majority of the computational trust approaches presented in liter-
ature estimates the trustworthiness of agents as a block and does not distinguish
between these trustees’ attributions.
In this paper, we present a computational trust approach grounded on multi-
disciplinary literature on trust that is able to capture the ability and benevolence
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of the agent under evaluation. Through its main component, Social Tuner, our
approach novels in its ability to estimate the trustee’s benevolence at the mo-
ment of the trust decision from the evidence available on this trustee.1 Moreover,
our approach combines the estimated ability of the trustee with his estimated
benevolence, as computed by Social Tuner, into a trustworthiness score, where
the relative importance and impact of ability and benevolence take into consid-
eration the development of the relationship between truster and trustee at the
time of the assessment. To prove the beneﬁts of our benevolence-based compu-
tational trust approach, we enhanced three known trust-based evidence aggrega-
tors – the one described in the Beta Reputation model [2], the asymmetry-based
trust update function described in [3], and our model Sinalpha [4] –, by adding
the functionalities of Social Tuner to these aggregators. The results we obtained
and present in this paper are very encouraging, as they showed that there is a
clear beneﬁt in using Social Tuner in the described situations: the benevolence-
enhanced trust models allowed for a more accurate estimation of the trustees’
trustworthiness than the original computational trust models.
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we overview theoretical
concepts relating trust and trustworthiness with benevolence. In Section 3, we
present the related work. Section 4 presents the main motivation for our work
and basic notation. In Section 5, we present our computational trust approach,
which is experimentally evaluated in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the
paper and presents future work.
2 The Relation between Trust and Benevolence
Trust is a property of the one that trusts, the truster, in relation to the object
of this trust, the trustee. To infer the trust on others, the truster needs to
estimate the trustworthiness of these others ([5–8]). In the same way, the truster’s
propensity to trust ([9, 6–8]), his emotional state ([10]), the trustee’s physical
and cultural characteristics ([11]), and potentially his reputation ([2, 11, 8]), are
other factors that the truster normally weights when making a trust judgment.
However, in this paper, we focus on the role of trustworthiness on trust.
A trustworthy entity would normally present high values of ability, integrity
and benevolence in the situation under assessment ([9, 12, 7]), and his behavior
would be predictable in this situation ([11, 8]). Ability relates to the potential
competence of the evaluated entity to do a given task, and is probably the trust-
worthiness dimension most mentioned by trust scholars (e.g., [9, 5, 13, 14, 8, 15]).
The truster perceives the trustee’s qualities that make the trustee able for the
task (e.g., skills, know how, general wisdom, self-esteem, self-conﬁdence, and
leadership) as mainly a cognitive process and less of an emotion-based process
([7]). Integrity and benevolence, however, are often overlooked by scholars, par-
ticularly computer scientists addressing the trust topic. In this paper, we are
particularly interested on benevolence, and do not further address the integrity
construct. Next, we overview essential theoretical aspects of benevolence.
1 An early draft of our work on benevolence-based trust is presented in [1].
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2.1 Benevolence
Benevolence is considered by several scholars as a key element of close relation-
ships and an antecedent of trustworthiness (e.g., [9, 12, 13, 16–18]). Benevolence
is either a disposition to do good and an act of kindness, where the trustee
has a feeling of goodwill toward the interacting partner excluding any intention
of harming him given the opportunity to do so ([12, 13]). It usually implies a
speciﬁc attachment of the truster toward the trusted one, excluding any mo-
tivation based on egocentric proﬁt motives (e.g., [9, 12]). Diﬀerent studies on
individual diﬀerences and human behavioral genetics link benevolence to Agree-
ableness and Neuroticism ([19, 20]), two personality traits that are inﬂuenced by
heredity, environment, time and gender ([21, 22]). Recent advances in the area
of behavioral neurology and cognitive neuroscience relate the human amygdala
with expressions of benevolence and normal interpersonal trust ([18]). Benev-
olence is also being positively correlated with the recognition of kinship and
physical resemblance (e.g., [23, 17]) and with in-group awareness and cultural
relatedness (e.g., [13, 16, 24]). All these studies propose that individuals have
a disposition toward benevolence, with some individuals being more benevolent
than others in identical situations.
Proposition 1. Disposition to Benevolence: Each individual has a speciﬁc
disposition to benevolence, related with his traits of personality.
Benevolence also develops in long-term and close relationships, where trust is
reciprocated and positive aﬀect circulates among those who express trust be-
haviorally, which may result in intense emotional investments being made ([25])
and in the internalization of relational norms and values ([16]).
Proposition 2. Relational Benevolence: In long-term and close relation-
ships, aﬀective commitment arises and has a positive impact on the benevolence
of partners. Then, the benevolence of the partner is usually perceived much later
in the relationship than this partner’s ability.
Some authors consider that there is a diﬀerent form of benevolence (‘mutualistic’
benevolence) that is motivated by the expectation of joint gain ([23, 26, 16]),
where the voluntary helping behaviors beyond the call of duty still exists. Most
partners that establish ongoing trust relationships beneﬁt from the benevolent
actions of the other partner, and tend to act benevolently in order to main-
tain the relationship and continue proﬁting from these trust-based beneﬁts (e.g.,
[12, 27, 26, 28, 16]). In these relationships, the satisfaction of partners increase
with the perception of the equity in the exchange and the perception of continu-
ity of the relationship ([12, 28, 16]). The partners probably do not risk investing
in the development of new relationships if they already have several ongoing
relationships ([26]). In the same way, the value they attach to a given trust
relationship may diminish if they perceive that the likelihood of being trusted
by somebody else is high ([12]). If we add to the satisfaction with the relation-
ship some form of utilitarianism – where individuals are more willing to rely on
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partners when they expect that the interaction with these partners brings more
beneﬁts than costs [28] – then we consider that the partners to the exchange de-
veloped a calculative commitment that eventually leads to the mutualistic form
of benevolence ([16]).
3 Related Work
The work in [15] presented a conceptual model of social trust based on [11]
that distinguishes between ability, positive intentions, ethics, and predictability.
The authors suggested a probabilistic approach to implement the model but
recognized the limits of such an approach in the treatment of the cognitive and
social concepts involved; this model was not implemented.
To date, the only computational approach that included a comprehensive set
of features grounded on the theory of trust and that was actually implemented
is the socio-cognitive model of trust by Castelfranchi and Falcone (e.g., [8, 29]).
This model considers that the truster has a goal that can be accomplished by
an action of the trustee, and that trust in a particular situation is formed by
considering the diﬀerent beliefs that the truster has about the trustee, either
internal (beliefs on competence, disposition, and unharmfulness) or external (op-
portunities and dangers). The values of these beliefs are further modulated by
meta-beliefs about the relative strength of each belief. The richness of this model
makes it hard to implement in practice. In fact, the current implementation of the
model (e.g., [8, 29]) requires extensive manual conﬁguration by domain experts
for each trustee and task under assessment and oversimpliﬁes the theoretical
model. Moreover, it requires explicit information about the competence and dis-
position (or similar beliefs) of the agent under evaluation, which may be hard
to get in dynamic agent-based environments. In our model, we adopted a more
pragmatic approach in the sense that we consider that the available evidence
may be scarce and does not necessarily discriminate about the diﬀerent attribu-
tions of the trustee. Finally, the work in [30] formalized in multimodal logic the
model of Castefranchi and Falcone, adding the notions of occurrent trust and
dispositional trust (i.e., trust in a general disposition of the trustee to perform
a similar task some point in the future).
4 Motivation and Notation
Most computational trust approaches estimate the trustees’ trustworthiness us-
ing individual items of evidence about these trustees’ behavior in past inter-
actions, either with the truster or with third party agents. However, none of
these approaches is able to estimate the benevolence of the trustee toward the
truster from the set of past evidence. Nevertheless, the particular outcome of an
exchange may depend not only on the ability (and integrity, predictability, etc)
of the trustee, but also on the benevolence relationship that exists between the
latter and the truster. In fact, we believe that understanding the benevolence
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of the trustee toward the truster at the moment of the trust decision is funda-
mental to accurately estimate the latter’s trustworthiness. With this in mind,
we present the main hypothesis of this work, as follows.
Hypothesis 1. The extraction of benevolence-based information from the set of
evidence on the trustee under evaluation and its use in adequate stages of the
relationship between truster and trustee improves the reliability of the estimation
of this trustee’s trustworthiness. The consequent reliability of the trust decision
is improved even when the available evidence is scarce.
4.1 Basic Notation
Our generic computational trust model is applied to environments where truster
agents select the best trustees to interact with, with the posterior establishment
of dyadic agreements between partners. We assume the existence of a society of
agents represented by the limited set A = {a1, a2, ..., an}. In this society, agents
make trust decisions about other agents concerning the realization of a given task
t ∈ T in a given situation s ∈ S, where T = {t1, t2, ..., tm} is the set of all possible
m tasks in the society and S = {s1, s2, ..., sk} is the set of all possible k situations
in the society. In order to characterize and describe the situation leading to an
agreement, we consider the deﬁnition of context as including four main types of
context: identity, time, location, and activity [31]. Furthermore, we consider that
context is expressed by eight dimensions d1, d2, ..., d8, where dimensions d1 and
d2 identify the truster and the trustee of the reported interaction, respectively;
d3 and d4 represent the time and location of agreement; and d5, d6, d7, and
d8 identify and characterize the type of the task, its complexity, deadline and
outcome of its realization, respectively.
In this work, we assume that all agreements performed in the society of agents
refer to the same type of task t (d5), although it can assume diﬀerent degrees
of complexity (d6) and deadlines (d7). Also, we consider that the set of possible
outcomes (d8) is deﬁned by O = {F,Fd , V }, where F (fulﬁll) means that the
truster considers that the trustee performed whatever matter he had to perform
on time, Fd (fulﬁll with delay) means that the truster was presented with an
unexpected delay in the realization of the task, and V (violation) means that
the truster considers that the trustee presented a severe contingency (e.g., the
task was not even performed, or the delay was excessive, or the quality was way
below the acceptable). We further consider that the relative preference relations
over these values is given by F  Fd  V (i.e., F is strictly preferable over Fd ,
and Fd is strictly preferable over V ), for all agents of the society.
In the sequence of our characterization of context, we represent any situation
si ∈ S as a tuple of values ascribed to each contextual dimension but the one
corresponding to the outcome dimension: si = 〈vsi1 , vsi2 , ..., vsi7 〉 ., where vsij is
the value ascribed to dimension j in situation si. Similarly, an individual item of
evidence ei is also represented using a tuple of values ascribed to each contextual
dimension, but now the outcome oei , corresponding to dimension d8, is manda-
tory: ei = 〈vei1 , vei2 , ..., vei8 〉 . Finally, the set of all items of evidence existing about
The Impact of Benevolence in Computational Trust 215
a given trustee y is given by E∗,y = {ei ∈ E : vei2 = y}, where E represents all
evidence available on all agents of society A. In the same way, Ex,y represents
all evidence about the direct past experiences of truster x with trustee y, such
that Ex,y = {ei ∈ E : vei1 = x, vei2 = y}.
5 Our Computational Model of Trust
The benevolence-based computational model of trust that we present in this
paper is part of a larger framework of social trust that we are developing at our
Laboratory. It integrates three distinct functions: the ability evaluation function
(Ax,y : S × E∗,y → [0, 1]), the benevolence evaluation function (Bx,y : Ex,y →
[0, 1]), and the trustworthiness evaluation function (Twx,y : [0, 1] × [0, 1] →
[0, 1]). We describe each of these functions (whose relation is illustrated in Figure
1) in the following subsections.
Fig. 1. Our benevolence-based computational model of trust
5.1 Function Ax,y – The Ability Component
As mentioned in the previous section, the ability evaluation function takes as
input all evidence available on the trustee (E∗,y) and the representation of the
situation s under assessments (cf. Figure 1). Taking into consideration that our
representation of evidence makes no explicit reference to the ability of the trustee,
we infer his ability from the aggregation of all evidence available, hoping at least
to understand whether he has very low ability (tending to violate most of his
agreements) or very high ability (tending to fulﬁll most of his agreements). To
this purpose, several existing trust-related evidence aggregators may be used,
such as the ones described in [2, 32, 3, 4].
5.2 Function Bx,y – The Social Tuner Component
The Social Tuner component is our proposal to instantiate the benevolence eval-
uation function Bx,y represented at the beginning of this section. Similarly to
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what happened when deﬁning function Ax,y, the challenge that we face is to
extract any information available about the trustee’s benevolence toward the
truster using only the structured, simple data from the evidential set Ex,y. In
this respect, we hypothesized that the use of such information would improve the
reliability of the trustworthiness estimation (Hypothesis 1). Of course, we realize
that any approach to benevolence in such conditions could not be comprehen-
sive in covering the benevolence concept. However, we believe that our initial
purpose of getting more from the available set of evidence in order to increase
the reliability of the estimated trustworthiness still maintains its validity.
In particular, Social Tuner measures the trustee’s speciﬁc attachment toward
the truster, i.e., his disposition to do good to the truster. This is captured by
the coeﬃcient of benevolent actions parameter, which we present next.
Coeﬃcient of Benevolent Actions. The coeﬃcient of benevolent actions,
ρba ∈ [0, 1], measures the trend of contingencies presented by the trustee to the
truster in the past. In this paper, the truster considers that the outcome Fd
corresponds to a mild contingency, while V is perceived as a severe contingency.
Hence, the ﬁrst step to calculate the trend of contingencies is to deﬁne how much
the truster values each outcome of his possible agreements, using function vl :
O → [0, 1]. Here, we consider that vl(F ) = 1.0, vl(Fd) = 0.5, and vl(V ) = 0.0.
Then, we build a function of the cumulative value of past agreements per gen-
erated outcome, cumValAgreem, which we deﬁne in Equation 1. Figure 2 (left)
illustrates the cumulative values of outcomes’ curve of three diﬀerent trustees,
each one having interacted 10 times with a given truster in the past, where
one of them fulﬁlled all agreements with the truster, the other delayed all the
agreements, and the remaining violated all agreements.
cumValAgreem(i) =
i∑
j=1
vl(oej ) . (1)
Finally, the coeﬃcient of benevolent actions is given by the correlation between
the number of agreements established between truster and trustee in the past
and the function of the cumulative value of past agreements calculated for these
agents. In order to get this correlation, we apply a linear regression to the func-
tion of the cumulative value of past agreements. Figure 2 (right) illustrates this
process for two diﬀerent agents: one that is initially very observant of his obli-
gations toward the truster but that inverts this behavior in the last agreements,
and the other presenting the opposite behavior.
Reminding the linear regression function for one predictor, Y = B0+B1.X , we
use this function to indicate the progress of the cumulative value of past agree-
ments, where X represents the past agreements and Y the cumulative function.
Particularly, we use the intercept (B0) and the regression coeﬃcient (B1) to es-
timate if the trustee’s benevolence toward the truster is steady, is progressing
positively, is progressing negatively, etc. This means that by using this process
we are able to estimate how the benevolence of this relationship is evolving.
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Fig. 2. Instances of the functions of cumulative value of agreements (left) and of benev-
olent actions per past agreements (right)
Finally, the coeﬃcient of benevolent actions is given by a function of the corre-
lation coeﬃcient and the intercept, as illustrated in Equation 2.
ρba = B0 + 0.10B1 . (2)
The value of this coeﬃcient is minimum (ρba = 0) when the trustee constantly
delivered the worse possible outcomes (i.e., V ) in past agreements with the
truster indicating that he was acting with no benevolence at all toward the
truster. Conversely, this value is maximum when the trustee totally fulﬁlled all
the past agreements with the truster, showing high benevolence toward him.
Estimating the Trustee’s Benevolence. The estimated value of the benev-
olence of the trustee toward the truster, benx,y, is derived from the coeﬃcient of
benevolent actions using the formula in Equation 3.
benx,y =
1
2
ρba +
1
2
∑|Ex,y|
i vl(o
ei)
|Ex,y| . (3)
It is worth noting that the estimation of benevolence is only possible when there
are, at least, two past interactions between the truster and the trustee under
evaluation. In the same way, this estimated value of the benevolence must be
updated at every new trustworthiness estimation, as the benevolence of agents
may evolve due to the mutualistic satisfaction/dissatisfaction of the trustee with
the relationship, which may change with time and context.
By evaluating the benevolence of the trustee toward the truster, we are able to
account for the emotional content of trust. For example, let us imagine that tra-
ditional (single-dimension) evidence aggregator derived a low to medium value
of trustworthiness for the trustee under evaluation; this might indicate that the
trustee is low in ability, benevolence, or both. However, if the Social Tuner in-
dicates a high value of benevolence of the trustee toward the truster, this may
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mean that both partners are engaged in a benevolent relationship, and that the
truster may expect the trustee to fulﬁll a future joint agreement.
In a contrasting example, if Social Tuner detects a low benevolence level
toward the trustee and the general trustworthiness score of the latter is high, it
is highly probable that the trustee has high ability in performing the task, but
has low benevolence toward the truster. Knowing this information, the truster
can either avoid to enter in a future agreement with the trustee, or give the ﬁrst
step to promote goodwill trust by not denouncing a contingency by the trustee.
However, if the trustee’s trustworthiness is low, this might indicate that the
trustee is either very low in ability or very low in benevolence (or both cases),
which gives a precious clue to the truster that the trustee is possibly not a good
partner to establish an agreement with.
5.3 Function Twx,y
The trustworthiness evaluation function Twx,y takes into consideration the per-
ception of the ability and benevolence of the trustee, ascribing more weight to
the ability dimension when both truster and trustee are practically strangers,
and progressively increasing the weight of benevolence as the partners get to
know each other better (Proposition 2). Twx,y is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1. Function Twx,y
1: function TW (E∗,y , Nbenclose) returns twx,y
2: E∗,y: the set of all evidence about trustee y
3: Nbenclose : minimum (x, y) interactions for closeness
4:
5: Ex,y ← {ei ∈ E∗,y : vei1 = x}
6: abx,y ← Ability (E∗,y)
7: benx,y ← Social Tuner (Ex,y)
8: Nx,y ← |Ex,y|
9: if Nx,y > Nbenclose then Nx,y = Nbenclose
10: if Nx,y > 1 then ωben = Nx,y/Nbenclose
11: else ωben = 0
12: twx,y = (1− ωben) · abx,y + ωben · benx,y
13: return twx,y
In the algorithm, we measured the number of interactions between x and y,
Nx,y (line 8), and deﬁned a minimum number of interactions between truster x
and trustee y, Nbenclose , after which the partners are considered to be engaged in
a close relationship (lines 3 and 9). Also, we considered a weight of benevolence,
ωben, to be used when combining the estimated value of the trustee’s ability
as returned by Ability (line 6) with the estimated value of its benevolence as
returned by Social Tuner (line 7). This weight is set to zero when there is just
one or zero interactions between both partners (line 11), and then progressively
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increases with the growing number of interactions between the partners, until
it reaches the maximum value of one when the partners are considered to be
in a close relationship (line 10). Finally, the estimated value of the trustee’s
trustworthiness (twx,y) is computed using the weighted mean of aba,y and benx,y
with weights (1− ωben) and ωben (line 12).
6 Simulated Experiments
6.1 Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted in an agent-based simulated environment where,
at every round of the simulations, diﬀerent types of trusters chose the best part-
ners to perform a task from a set of trustees with diﬀerent characteristics. For
simplicity, we considered that there was only one task being negotiated by all
trusters, although its requirements in terms of complexity and due time changed
with round and truster; also, all trustees accepted to negotiate with all trusters.
We used a behavioral model of agents that we have developed in [1]. This model
starts after the establishment of an agreement between the truster and the se-
lected trustee, thus excluding the selection process itself. It focuses on both types
of agents’ decision concerning the fulﬁllment of the established agreement: the
trustees may opt to fulﬁll the agreement (trusters will report outcome F ), or
to delay its realization; accordingly, the trusters may respond to a delay by ei-
ther retaliating, denouncing the breach (reporting outcome V ), or forgiving the
contingency (reporting outcome Fd).
Decision about the Agreements’ Outcome. The ﬁnal decision about the
outcome of the agreement is governed by diﬀerent parameters, including the dis-
position to benevolence (Proposition 1) and the ability of agents, the satisfaction
with the relationship, and the mutualistic benevolence of agents. On one hand,
every agent was assigned a random dispositional benevolence at setup following
an uniform distribution over values low, medium and high. Besides, agents with
the role of trustee were also randomly assigned a value of ability following a simi-
lar distribution. On the other hand, the satisfaction of agents with their partners
was inferred from the perspective of the continuity of the relationship and the
perception of inequities at the moment of the decision. Finally, the mutualistic
benevolence of agents was derived from their satisfaction with the relationship,
the value of the agreement under assessment derived from the complexity of the
task, and the number of alternate relationships. A detailed description of this
model is presented in [1].
Selection Decision. Every experiment had a predeﬁned number of rounds. A
diﬀerent selection process was initiated by each truster at every round, by gener-
ating and announcing the complexity (contextual dimension d6) and the deadline
(d7) of the task. The task conditions were then transmitted to all potential part-
ners (represented by set Y) through a call for proposals (cfp). In response, these
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partners proposed (randomly generated) values for the complexity and deadline
of the task that were more or less close to the ones speciﬁed in the cfp. We used
then a heuristic to compute the ‘utility’ of each proposal (up) based on the shift
of the proposed values to the cfp values. Finally, each truster selected the highest
rated partner based on the candidates’ trustworthiness (twx,y) and the utility of
their proposals, as follows: argmaxyi∈Y(1/2twx,yi + 1/2upyi).
Types of Trusters. We considered three diﬀerent basic types of trusters: B
agents, which used the well know Beta Reputation trust-based evidence aggre-
gation algorithm [2] to compute the trustworthiness scores; J agents, which used
the well-known asymmetry-based trust update function deﬁned in [3] to estimate
trustworthiness; and S agents, which used our aggregator Sinalpha ([4]).
6.2 Experiments and Results
In this set of experiments, we wanted to test Hypothesis 1, which we reformulated
as follows: In the presence of populations of trusters and trustees that evolve their
behavior based on the benevolent relationships they are able to develop with each
others, trusters that are able to extract the benevolence of the trustees toward the
trusters from the available evidence using Social Tuner will perform better than
those that do not have this ability.
Then, we deﬁned three new types of agents, BB, JB and SB, which used a
trustworthiness evaluation function composed of the basic trust-based evidence
aggregator (used in B, J and S, respectively) combined with the functionalities of
Social Tuner, as deﬁned in in Algorithm 1. Hence, we are evaluating the beneﬁts
of using Social-Tuner when applied to diﬀerent types of trustworthiness estima-
tors. These last trusters performed an additional selection procedure, described
as follows: just before ordering the proposals by trustworthiness and utility, each
truster removed from the set of all considered proposals these proposals owned
by trustees that did not reach a benevolence threshold given by the average
of the mean and the maximum benevolence values presented by all candidates.
Hence, we ran six diﬀerent types of trusters simultaneously (B, J, S, BB, JB and
SB), each with four agents.
In order to compare all approaches, we measured and averaged the number of
agreements with outcomes F , Fd and V , as well as the utility of the proposals
of the selected trustees. Moreover, in order to better evaluate the eﬀect of using
the Social Tuner component in diﬀerent conditions regarding the number of
interactions between trusters and trustees, we further ran the experiments with
20, 50, and 100 rounds. We set Nbenclose = 15 (cf. Algorithm 1).
The results of these experiments in terms of outcomes of type F and V (in-
cluding mean M and standard deviation SD) are systematized in Table 1. We
veriﬁed that the eﬀect of adding Social Tuner to a simple trust-based evidence
aggregator depended on the number of rounds considered. For instance, with only
20 rounds, when the number of interactions between any two partners was not
large, there was an increase in the number of outcomes of type F for all trusters
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using Social Tuner when compared with their benevolence-less counterparts, but
the diﬀerence was not statistically signiﬁcant when using t-tests with Bonferroni
adjustments (SB/S: +2.20% of outcomes of type F , t(29) = 1.34, p = 0.09; BB/B:
+4.72% F , t(29) = 2.21, p = 0.02;JB/J: +1.09% F , t(29) = 0.66, p = 0.26). With
50 rounds, we veriﬁed that the addition of Social Tuner increased the number of
outcomes of type F at least in 5.38%, for all basic aggregators, with all results
being statistically signiﬁcant (SB/S: +5.89% F , t(29) = 2.85, p < 0.008; BB/B:
+6.05% F , t(29) = 3.87, p < 0.008;JB/J: +5.38% F , t(29) = 4.61, p < 0.008).
Finally, with 100 rounds, we got an even more relevant increase in the num-
ber of outcomes F using Social Tuner, conﬁrming that this component is in
fact eﬀective in capturing the benevolence existing between any pair of trusters-
trustees(SB/S: +9.79% F , t(29) = 5.41, p < 0.008; BB/B: +7.52% F , t(29) =
5.55, p < 0.008;JB/J: +8.41% F , t(29) = 6.60, p < 0.008). The results obtained
concerning outcomes of type V where in line of those just described, as can be
conﬁrmed from Table 1.
Table 1. Outcomes of types F and V per truster type and number of rounds
outcome F outcome V
20 rounds 50 rounds 100 rounds 20 rounds 50 rounds 100 rounds
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
S 0.817 0.081 0.803 0.113 0.770 0.105 0.093 0.052 0.110 0.066 0.119 0.066
SB 0.835 0.067 0.850 0.095 0.845 0.091 0.077 0.047 0.080 0.063 0.078 0.057
B 0.762 0.090 0.777 0.074 0.753 0.069 0.133 0.070 0.132 0.052 0.142 0.050
BB 0.798 0.084 0.824 0.091 0.810 0.070 0.107 0.055 0.096 0.056 0.101 0.041
J 0.827 0.084 0.799 0.075 0.765 0.067 0.088 0.052 0.115 0.050 0.129 0.043
JB 0.836 0.071 0.842 0.081 0.830 0.081 0.076 0.046 0.078 0.044 0.088 0.046
We intended to further test Hypothesis 1, and then we formulated an addi-
tional hypothesis, described as follows: In the presence of populations of trusters
and trustees of homogeneous benevolence, trusters that use the Social Tuner
component will perform no worse than those that do not use this component.
In order to test this new hypothesis, we made important changes to the be-
havioral model of agents described before. First, we set the dispositional benevo-
lence of both trusters and trustees to a ﬁxed value ofMedium. Second, the ability
in agreement, which determines whether the trustees fulﬁll or delay their agree-
ments given the eﬀort required to perform the agreement, is no longer dependent
on the benevolence of these trustees toward the exchange partner, and is given
solely by the trustees’ ability (for more on this, cf. [1]). Hence, the resulting
agents are not driven by benevolence.
We ran this set of experiments again with six diﬀerent types of trusters run-
ning simultaneously, each with four agents: S, SB, B, BB, J, and JB. All experi-
ments had 100 rounds. The results of these experiments, in terms of outcomes
of types F and V , are systematized in Table 2.
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Table 2. Outcomes of type F and V per truster type (100 rounds)
outcome F outcome V
M SD M SD
S 0.941 0.055 0.028 0.028
SB 0.947 0.061 0.025 0.030
B 0.910 0.058 0.048 0.034
BB 0.933 0.059 0.031 0.028
J 0.927 0.056 0.036 0.028
JB 0.938 0.054 0.027 0.026
From the results, we observed that no one of the three chosen trust-based
evidence aggregators (i.e., S, B, and J) performed more poorly when combined
with the Social Tuner component. In fact, all of them performed a little better
in terms of outcome F , although this increase was only statistically signiﬁcant
(using t-tests and Bonferroni adjustments) with model B (t(29) = −4.51, p <
0.003). The same happened when measuring the outcomes of type V , where the
decrease observed with model B was statistically signiﬁcant (t(29) = 5.67, p <
0.003). Overall, in the conditions of these two sets of experiments, we were able
to conﬁrm the truthfulness of Hypothesis 1.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
Computational trust is crucial for well-based decision making regarding possible
agents’ future joint activities. It heavily relies on the estimation of trustworthi-
ness to assess the trust on particular trustees. To better estimate this trustwor-
thiness, it is important to estimate, besides other relevant features, their ability
and benevolence separately, and to combine them taking into consideration the
particular situation and relationship. However, the majority of the computa-
tional trust approaches presented in literature estimates the trustworthiness of
agents as a block and does not consider its dimensions in an individual form. The
exception is the model of [8], which, however, assumes the existence of explicit
information on benevolence, and does not present any alternative mechanism to
infer this benevolence from past actions, when it is needed.
In this paper, we described a part of our computational model of trust, which
is a novel approach based on the socio-cognitive trust theory that produces indi-
vidual estimations of the ability and benevolence of trustees and combines these
estimations in a dynamic way, taking into account the relationship existing be-
tween truster and trustee at any given moment and situation. We evaluated our
approach in a simulated experimental environment by comparing three known
trust-based evidence aggregators with three enhanced versions of these aggrega-
tors; the benevolence-enhanced models aggregated the values of the estimated
ability (as calculated by the simple aggregators) with the estimated benevo-
lence (as calculated by Social Tuner) in a dynamic way, where the weight of
benevolence in the trustworthiness formula grew with the increasing number of
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interactions between any truster-trustee pair. To perform the comparison, we
measured the outcomes of the interactions between trusters and trustees with
and without the addition of Social Tuner. Besides, we went beyond traditional
evaluation of computational trust models and used a model of agents’ behavior
where both trusters and trustees evolve their behaviors based on personality
traits, mutualistic interests and the stage of the diﬀerent relationships existing
between the agents.
The results have shown that, using exactly the same evidential datasets, the
approaches that included the addition of Social Tuner increased the number of
outcomes of type F and decreased the number of outcomes of type V for all of
these trust-based aggregators, for all number of rounds considered. Therefore,
we concluded that the use of Social Tuner allowed for a signiﬁcant improvement
in trustworthiness estimation, leading to better computational trust models in
the described situations. Concerning future work, we intend to further identify
the particular circumstances in which the use of this sophisticated trust model
is more relevant. Also, we intend to explore integrity as another dimension of
trustworthiness, as well as to explore other ways of combining the trustworthiness
dimensions, and to use other antecedents of trust, such as the trusters’ own
propensity to trust.
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